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We consider the impact of mandatory information disclosure on bank safety in a 
spatial model of banking competition in which a bank’s probability of success 
depends on the quality of its risk measurement and management systems. Under 
Basel II capital requirements, this quality is either fully or partially disclosed to 
market participants by the Pillar 3 disclosures. We show that, under stringent 
Pillar 3 disclosure requirements, banks’ equilibrium probability of success and 
total welfare may be higher under a simple Basel II standardized approach than 
under the more sophisticated internal ratings-based (IRB) approach. 
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Basel II -vakavaraisuusvaatimusten vaikutus pankkien 
riskillisyyteen 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 29/2009 
Jukka Vauhkonen 




Pankkien uusi Baselin komitean suosituksiin perustuva vakavaraisuussäännöstö 
eli Basel II perustuu kolmeen toisiaan täydentävään ns. pilariin. Valtaosassa Basel 
II:n taloudellisia vaikutuksia koskevista tutkimuksista keskitytään pilarin 1, eli 
vähimmäispääomavaatimuksen laskentaa koskevien säännösten vaikutusten ar-
viointiin. Tässä työssä sen sijaan tarkastellaan pilarin 1 ja pankkien julkistamis-
vaatimuksia koskevan pilarin 3 yhteisvaikutusta pankkien riskinottokannustimiin 
epätäydellisen pankkikilpailun mallissa, jossa pankin vanhat osakkeenomistajat, 
ns. sisäpiiriläiset, johtavat pankkia ja maksimoivat omaa hyötyään. Mallissa pää-
omavaatimusten tavoitteena on kohdistaa pankin epäonnistuneen riskinoton kus-
tannuksia osakkeenomistajille ja siten lieventää täysimääräisen talletussuojan vää-
ristämiä pankkien riskinottokannustimia. Mallissa osoitetaan, että tämä pääoma-
vaatimusten positiivinen ns. capital-at-risk-kannustinvaikutus voi olla suurempi 
Basel II:n luottoriskin standardimenetelmässä kuin Basel II:n sisäisten luokitusten 
(IRB) menetelmässä silloin, kun pilarin 3 edellyttämät tiedot antavat pankin riskil-
lisyydestä tarkan kuvan, ja pienempi silloin, kun ne antavat riskillisyydestä epä-
tarkan kuvan. 
 
Avainsanat: Basel II, vakavaraisuuden sääntely, julkistamisvaatimukset, mark-
kinakuri, moraalikato 
 
JEL-luokittelu: D43, D82, G14, G21, G28  
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The financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 revealed serious 
shortcomings in financial institutions’ risk management and in the transparency of 
their actions. Alarmingly, risk management badly failed even in some of the 
biggest and most sophisticated financial institutions (see eg Banziger, 2008). The 
lack of transparency of financial institutions’ exposures to securitized instruments 
and off-balance sheet vehicles, in turn, contributed to the severity of the crisis (see 
eg Gorton, 2008). Thereby, a major lesson of the crisis is that financial 
institutions’ risk management and the disclosure of their on and off balance risks 
must be improved (see eg FSF, 2008, and G20, 2008). 
  Banks’ new Basel II capital requirements are widely believed to be a step 
forward in this respect, as the Pillar 3 of the new framework – market discipline – 
requires banks to disclose detailed information on their risk profile, capital 
adequacy, and risk assessment processes (Basel Committee, 2006a).
1 Ideally, 
Pillar 3 disclosures can help investors in identifying changes in banks’ conditions 
and incorporating these changes into banks’ security prices. This, in turn, is 
supposed to enhance banks’ incentives to behave prudently and improve their risk 
management. 
  Despite the potential importance of the Pillar 3, most of the academic 
literature on Basel II concentrates only on the effects of minimum capital ratios, 
that is, Pillar 1 of the new framework (for exceptions, see Décamps et al, 2004, 
and Rochet, 2004). In this paper, we examine the combined effect of the Pillar 1 
minimum capital requirements and Pillar 3 disclosure requirements.
2 We show 
that the disclosure requirements may indeed enhance the effectiveness of 
minimum capital ratios by increasing banks’ incentives to improve the quality of 
their risk measurement and management systems. Somewhat surprisingly, this 
positive impact may be stronger under the simple Basel II standardized approach 
than under the more sophisticated internal ratings-based (IRB) approach. This 
result is most likely to hold, if the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements are relatively 
stringent and if the regulatory qualifying criteria for the use of the IRB approach 
are relatively lax. 
                                                 
1 The Pillar 3 disclosure requirements include both quantitative and qualitative disclosures, for 
example, on banks’ capital structure; the risks to which banks are exposed and the techniques that 
banks use to identify, measure, monitor and control those risks; risk management objectives and 
policies; geographic, industry and counterparty type distribution of exposures; structure of internal 
ratings system and relation between internal and external ratings; description of the internal ratings 
process; information about risk parameters such as probabilities of default (PD) and loss given 
default (LGD) in a portfolio level; the process for managing and recognizing credit risk mitigation, 
and the bank’s role in the securitization process and the amount of securitized exposures. Most of 
the disclosures should be made on a semi-annual basis (see Basel Committee, 2006a, Part 4). 
2 The Pillar 2 of the Basel II framework, the supervisory review process, is indirectly taken into 
account in our specification of the IRB approach, see below.  
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  We consider a Salop-type spatial model of imperfect banking competition 
with four types of agents: banks’ inside and outside shareholders (insiders and 
outsiders), depositors and the regulator (supervisor). Insiders, who are either 
owner-managers or old shareholders and who maximize their own payoffs, make 
the decisions in the banks. Banks are funded by fully insured deposits and capital. 
They compete for deposits by setting their deposit rates and have market power as 
depositors must incur transportation costs when travelling to a bank. 
  Banks invest funds in a single loan (portfolio). A bank’s probability of 
success depends on the quality of its risk measurement and management systems 
(for brevity, the ‘quality of risk management’ or just ‘quality’), chosen by the 
bank’s insiders. Without common disclosure criteria such as the Pillar 3, this 
quality is unobservable to market participants, as a voluntary disclosure is 
assumed to be infeasible. Furthermore, in the absence of disclosure and capital 
requirements, the equilibrium quality of risk management is lower than the first-
best as insiders do not reap the full return of their effort. 
  The regulator’s aim is to alleviate this moral hazard problem by requiring 
banks to raise capital. By setting capital requirements, the regulator attempts to 
increase banks’ shareholders’ losses in case of default and induce banks to reduce 
the probability of failure by improving their risk management systems. In the 
above set-up, we model three different regulatory capital approaches for credit 
risk – the previous Basel I capital requirements and the two options of the new 
Basel II capital requirements, the standardized approach (SA) and Basel II internal 
ratings-based (IRB) approach – in a stylized fashion and examine their impacts on 
the equilibrium quality of banks’ risk management.
3 
  On the basis of Besanko and Kanatas (1996) and Hellmann et al (2000), for 
example, capital requirements may potentially influence bank insiders’ incentives 
through two effects: the dilution effect
4 and the capital at risk effect. The dilution 
effect is typically negative. Capital requirements force banks to raise new capital, 
which erodes bank insiders’ payoffs and reduces their incentives to to improve the 
quality of risk management. On the other hand, as shown by Hellmann et al 
(2000) and others, the larger is a bank’s capital-to-deposit ratio, the larger is the 
downside risk that bank insiders bear. This capital at risk effect tends to improve 
insiders’ incentives. It also plays a key role in our paper. 
  In our set-up, Basel I is, as usual, characterized by a flat-rate minimum 
regulatory capital-to-deposits ratio. In addition, we assume that under Basel I, the 
quality of banks’ risk management is unobservable to outsiders. Given these 
                                                 
3 A large number of countries have already adopted the Basel II framework. The EU’s capital 
requirement directives (CRD) were adapted progressively during 2007–2008. However, for 
example the US is still in the process of adopting the framework. 
4 This dilution effect is, essentially, equivalent to the franchise value effect studied in multi-period 
settings by Hellmann et al (2000) and Repullo (2004). However, in our static environment, we 
prefer to use the term dilution effect.  
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assumptions, we show that Basel I has no effect on banks’ equilibrium probability 
of success relative to the benchmark of no regulation, as neither the dilution effect 
nor the capital at risk effect are at work. Similarly as in Repullo (2004), the 
dilution effect does not operate, since the cost of capital requirement is fully 
transferred to depositors. The capital at risk effect does not operate, since insiders 
have no own capital at stake and as the risk of an individual bank is unobservable 
to outsiders. Thus, our results suggest that flat-rate capital requirements, such as 
Basel I, can be fairly ineffective in improving bank safety, if there are serious 
conflicts of interests between banks’ insiders and other equityholders and if 
insiders’ actions are not transparent to market participants. 
  Next, we examine a scenario in which all banks are required to use the Basel 
II standardized approach, which can be regarded as a refinement of the Basel I 
approach. The difference between the approaches in our set-up is that under the 
standardized approach, the quality of banks’ risk management systems is made 
either fully or partially observable by the Basel II Pillar 3 disclosures. We show 
that by making the risk of an individual bank observable, the disclosure affects the 
bank’s cost of capital and increases the equilibrium quality of banks’ risk 
management systems. Thus, this result supports the argument by Gordy and 
Howells (2006, p. 397) that the ultimate success of Pillar 1 standards rests on how 
well the Pillar 3 functions. 
  Then, we examine the scenario in which all banks must choose the IRB 
approach. We consider a reduced version of the IRB approach by modeling three 
key elements of the IRB approach. First, to be eligible to enter into and use the 
IRB approach a bank has to satisfy an extensive set of qualifying requirements. In 
our model, these requirements define the minimum quality of banks’ risk 
management systems under the IRB approach. Second, the minimum capital 
requirement for banks is lower under the IRB approach than under the 
standardized approach.
5 Third, similarly as under the Basel II standardized 
approach, the quality of banks’ risk management systems is made either fully or 
partially observable by the Pillar 3 disclosures.
6 
  Given these assumptions, our key finding is that the superiority between the 
IRB approach and the Basel II standardized approach in improving bank safety 
depends crucially on the stringency of the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements and the 
IRB qualifying requirements. We show that under stringent Pillar 3 disclosure 
requirements and lax IRB qualifying requirements, the equilibrium quality of 
banks’ risk management systems is higher and thus their equilibrium probability 
                                                 
5 The Basel Committee’s quantitative impact studies indeed suggest that the average minimum 
capital requirements under the IRB approach are lower than those under the standardized 
approach, see www.bis.org. 
6 The best-known difference between the IRB approach and the standardized approach is that in 
the former banks can use their own internal estimates of risk components to compute capital 
charges for their exposures. There is already a vast literature on the potential impacts of this 
difference. For a recent survey, see VanHoose (2007).  
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of default lower under the Basel II standardized approach than under the IRB 
approach. Under lax Pillar 3 disclosure requirements, in turn, the IRB approach 
generates higher bank safety in the equilibrium than the standardized approach. 
  Our model is largely based on Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2002), who study 
the effects of market discipline and deposit insurance on bank risk-taking. We 
abstract deposit insurance but introduce bank insiders and outsiders as well as 
capital requirements into their set-up. Our model is also related to the models by 
Hellmann et al (2000) and Repullo (2004) on the effects of capital regulation on 
bank risk-taking. Our model differs from their models in that we examine the 
combined effect of capital requirements and disclosure. In addition, in our model 
the moral hazard stems from effort aversion whereas in their models it stems from 
asset substitution. Besanko and Kanatas (1996), similarly like us, examine the 
effects of capital regulation on bank safety in a model with bank insiders and 
outside investors. In their model, capital requirements may worsen the effort-
aversion moral hazard problem, as outsiders’ capital injection dilutes insiders’ 
expected surplus from successful projects. In our model with explicitly specified 
competition in deposit markets, there is no such negative dilution effect, as the 
cost of capital requirements is fully passed to depositors. 
  The present paper examines the disciplining role of outside equityholders on 
banks. There are several papers which analyse the disciplining role of creditors 
(see eg Calomiris and Kahn, 1991, and Diamond and Rajan, 2001). In most of 
these studies, banks’ creditors can punish banks by withdrawing their demandable 
deposits or by not rolling their short-term loans, if they are not satisfied with the 
bank’s performance. Thus, these models examine the impact of interim or the ex 
post market discipline on banks. In Blum (2002), similarly as in this paper, market 
discipline operates ex ante through the pricing of banks’ funding. He examines the 
impact of subordinated debt on banks’ risk-taking, and shows that subordinated 
debt may lead to an increase in risk, if a bank cannot credibly commit to a given 
level of risk. In our model the commitment is not a problem, as bank insiders 
choose their risk-taking (the quality of risk management systems) before the funds 
are raised. Instead, in our model the severity of the moral hazard problem depends 
on the regulatory choices and the degree of transparency on banks’ actions. 
  Finally, there is a relatively large literature on the effects of mandatory 
disclosure requirements on bank risk taking and financial stability (for a survey, 
see Frolov, 2007).
7 This literature suggests that the effects of mandatory 
disclosures may not always be positive. We, however, focus on the beneficial 
effects of the increased transparency and extend the literature on mandatory 
disclosure requirements by relating our analysis explicitly to the new Basel II 
framework. 
                                                 
7 For empirical research on how the market prices of bank liabilities react to information about 
bank risk and to what degree does market discipline actually affect bank behavior, see eg. Flannery 
(1998) and Nier and Baumann (2006).  
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2 The  model 
Consider a spatial competition model of banking with four sets of risk neutral 
agents: bank insiders, outside investors, depositors and a bank regulator 
(supervisor). There are n  ≥  3 identical banks indexed by i  =  1,...,n, which are 
symmetrically distributed around a unit circle. Banks are run by insiders, who 
maximize their utility. Banks invest funds in a single loan (portfolio) with a gross 
return R, 1 < R < 2, per a unit of investment, if it succeeds. If the loan fails, the 
return is 0, in which case the bank goes bankrupt. The probability that the loan 
will be repaid is equal to the quality of the bank’s risk management systems 




  Banks compete for funds in imperfectly competitive deposit markets by 
offering depositors a (gross) deposit rate, ri,  i = 1,...,n,  ri ∈  [1,R]. There is a 
continuum of depositors uniformly distributed along a unit circle. Each depositor 
is endowed with a unit of funds that he can invest either in bank deposits by 
incurring a transportation cost µ per a unit of distance or in an outside asset. The 
total volume of deposits is normalised to 1 and the return of the outside asset to 
zero. Deposits are fully insured with zero deposit insurance premia. Therefore, 
when choosing a bank in which to deposit, a depositor is only interested in the 
offered deposit rates and in the distance between him and the two adjacent banks. 








) r , r ( D
i
i i  (2.1) 
 
where r denotes the common deposit rate of all other banks. In a symmetric 
equilibrium ri = r, and each bank’s share of deposits is 1/n. 
  At t = 0 the regulator may require banks to hold at least kfDi (or kIRBDi) units 
of capital, where kf is the flat minimum required capital-to-deposit ratio under the 
Basel I and Basel II standardized approaches and kIRB is the minimum required 
capital-to-deposit ratio under the IRB approach.
10 Prior to t = 0 banks have no 
                                                 
8 This is a reduced way to capturing the fact that the quality of a bank’s risk measurement and 
management systems affects the bank’s riskiness. When a bank’s insiders put more effort in 
improving risk management, the bank improves its ability to select high-quality customers, to use 
risk mitigation techniques, to design and enforce financial contracts etc., which reduce its 
probability of failure. 
9 The assumption C(qi) = qi
2 together with the assumption 1  <  R  <  2 ensures that, at an 
equilibrium, q < 1. 
10 Actually, Basel I and Basel II capital requirements are proportional to a bank’s (risk-weighted) 
assets, not to it’s deposits. In our model, however, assets are equal to the deposits. Notice also that 
in our set-up the minimum capital-to-deposit ratios (or capital-to-asset ratios) are essentially 
similar to the leverage ratio restrictions. For a model with both leverage rate restrictions and risk-
based capital requirements, see Blum (2008).  
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capital for regulatory capital purposes. We assume that banks’ initial capital, 
provided by inside shareholders, is so small that it can be assumed to be 0. 
Insiders have no more funds, so they must raise the capital from outsiders to 
satisfy the capital requirement. Outsiders’ required expected (gross) rate of return 
is  ρ. Following Hellmann et al (2000) and Repullo (2004), for example, we 
assume that ρ > R, so that capital is costly. The capital must be readily available 
to cover banks’ losses in any circumstances. Therefore, the capital must be 
invested in the risk-free outside asset. 
  The timing is the following. 
 
t=0:  The regulator sets the regulatory regime: no regulation, Basel I, Basel II 
standardized approach or Basel II IRB approach. 
t=1:  Banks set their deposit rates, the amount of capital they wish to raise, and 
the quality of their risk management systems. 
t=2:  Depositors choose the bank in which to deposit. 
t=3:  Banks raise the capital. 
t=4:  Banks invest funds in the loan (portfolio). 
t=5: Returns  are  shared between the parties. 
 
In contrast to the most usual assumption, we assume that banks choose the quality 
of their risk management systems (effort) before they raise the funds. This 
assumption can be justified by the fact that it takes considerable time and effort 
from the bank management to build a bank’s institution-specific and often very 
complex risk management systems. Therefore, in our set-up, it is natural to 
assume that the risk management systems must be in place before banks’ apply 
for funding. The assumption that the capital is raised after deposits, in turn, 
follows from our assumption that the required capital must be proportional to a 
bank’s deposit base. 
  All parties observe the regulatory regime, banks’ posted deposit rates and 
banks’ desired level of capital. Banks are able to commit to their posted deposit 
rates, so they cannot renegotiate their rates once depositors have travelled to 
banks. In the absence of mandatory disclosure requirements (under no regulation 
and Basel I), market participants (outsiders and depositors) do not observe the 
quality of banks’ risk management systems. A voluntary disclosure by banks is 
neither possible or is prohibitively costly. Under the Basel II standardized and 
IRB approaches the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements make the quality of an 
individual bank’s risk management systems either fully (sections 4 to 6) or 




3  Benchmark: no regulation and disclosure 
In what follows, we derive banks’ equilibrium safety, that is, the equilibrium 
quality of their risk management systems, under different regulatory regimes and 
under different assumptions concerning the observability of the quality of the risk 
management systems. 
  As a benchmark, consider the problem of bank i’s insiders in the absence of 
regulation and disclosure. Assume, for a moment, that banks do not voluntarily 
hold any capital.
11 Thus, they are funded only with deposits. Given these 
assumptions, bank i’s insiders choose the quality of their risk management 
systems, qi, and the deposit rate, ri, to maximise 
 
2
i i i i
B
i q D ) r R ( q − − = π  (3.1) 
 
where Di is given by (2.1). 
  Taking the first-order conditions, solving for qi and ri, and assuming 









=  (3.2) 
 
The equilibrium quality of risk management systems under the benchmark is 
lower than the first-best
12, as insiders do not reap the full return of their effort. As 
a result, banks underinvest in the quality of their risk management systems. This 
provides the rationale for regulation. 
 
 
4  Flat capital requirements without information 
disclosure: Basel I 
To mitigate the moral hazard problem, the regulator requires banks to raise 
capital. Under Basel I capital requirements, banks are required to hold, at 
minimum, kf units of capital per a unit of deposits. In addition, similarly as under 
the benchmark, the quality of banks’ risk management systems is not disclosed to 
the public and the voluntary disclosure is not possible or is prohibitively costly. 
  Banks raise the required capital from competitive capital markets, where 
investors’ (outsiders) required rate of return on their investment is ρ. Suppose that 
                                                 
11 In the following sections, we show that banks indeed never hold any excess capital. 
12 The first-best action qFB maximizes the social payoffs of the project, πi
FB=qiR – qi
2. The first-
order condition with respect to qi is ∂πi
FB/qi = R – 2qi = 0 and the first-best quality qFB = R/2.  
14 
bank i raises Di units of deposits with a deposit rate ri, and wishes to raise kiDi 
units of capital. Outsiders provide this capital to the bank if their expected payoffs 
from the bank’s investment project are equal to their required rate of return on 




i D k D ) k r R ( q S ρ = + − , where 
I
i S  denotes the 
proportion of bank i’s shares allocated to outsiders (the cost of capital) under the 
Basel I capital requirements. Solving for 
I
i S  gives 
 
) k r R ( q
k









=  (4.1) 
 
Note that in the absence of information disclosure, an individual bank’s cost of 
capital is a function of the expected quality of the bank’s risk management 
systems, 
e
i q . Therefore, as the actual quality is not observable, the bank’s insiders 
can choose a low quality without being penalized by an increase in their bank’s 
cost of capital. 
  In what follows we derive the interior symmetric rational expectations Nash 
equilibrium
13, which is defined by qualities q  =  q1 = ... = qn, q  ∈ [0,1],  deposit 
rates r = r1 = ... = rn, r ∈ [1,R] and capital-to-deposit ratios k = k1 = ... = kn such 
that 
 




1 = = = =  
(ii)  each bank’s insiders maximize their payoffs πi at (q,r,k) when all other 
banks’ insiders choose the equilibrium quality, equilibrium deposit rate and 
equilibrium capital-to-deposit ratio, that is  ) k , r , q , q ( max arg q i i ] 1 , 0 [ qi π = ∈ , 
) k , r , q , r ( max arg r i i ] 1 , 0 [ ri π = ∈ , and  ) k , r , q , k ( max arg k i i ki π =  
(iii)  deposit markets are covered
14:  n 2 / 1 r r μ + ≡ ≥  
(iv)  banks satisfy the Basel I regulatory capital requirement: k ≥ kf 
 
Given these constraints, the bank i’s insiders’ problem can be written as 
 
} q D ) k r R ( q ) S 1 {( Max
2
i i i i i
I
i k k , r r ], 1 , 0 [ q f i i i
− + − −
≥ ≥ ∈  (4.2) 
 
where Di is defined by (2.1) and 
I
i S  in (4.1). 
                                                 
13 The analysis of Matutes and Vives (1996) suggests that outsiders’ different possible prior 
expectations on qi, i = 1,…,n could become self-fulfilling and lead to multiple equilibria. However, 
to avoid these complexities, we only focus on the interior symmetric rational expectations Nash 
equilibrium. 
14 Deposit markets are covered, when the depositors in the midpoint of two adjacent banks are 
indifferent between depositing and investing in the outside asset. Their distance from the nearest 
bank is 1/2n and their cost of travelling there is µ/2n.  
15 
  First, we show that the constraint ki ≥ kf is binding in the equilibrium. 
Differentiating (4.2) with respect to ki and imposing rational expectations gives 
(q – ρ)Di < 0. So, we have a corner solution, ki = kf. This is a natural consequence 
of the fact that capital is costly, ρ > R. With costly capital, there is no reason for 
banks to hold any excess capital in our model. 
  By differentiating (4.2) with respect to qi and ri, setting ki = kf, and imposing 
symmetry and rational expectations, we obtain the first-order conditions which 
implicitly determine the interior symmetric equilibrium quality and deposit rates 





















k ) k r R ( q
r
f f i I = −






By (4.3a) and (4.3b), the equilibrium quality and the deposit rate under the interior 























f I 2 I  (4.4) 
 
We assume that the parameters of the model are such that we obtain an interior 
solution for the equilibrium interest rate,  r rI > .
15 Comparing (4.4) to the 
benchmark quality and deposit rate (3.2) gives now the following result. 
 
Proposition 1. The equilibrium quality of banks’ risk management systems under 
the Basel I is equal to and the deposit rate lower than the corresponding 
equilibrium levels under the benchmark. 
 
Thus, in the absence of information disclosure, Basel I capital requirements have 
no effect on the quality of banks’ risk management. This is because neither the 
dilution effect nor the capital at risk effect of capital requirements affects insiders’ 
incentives. The former does not operate, since, as in Repullo (2004), the cost of 
capital requirements is fully passed to depositors. The latter does not operate, 
since insiders have no own capital at stake and as outsiders do not observe the 
quality. As insiders have no own capital at stake, the regulatory capital 
requirement has no direct capital at risk effect on their effort. In addition, as 
                                                 
15 That is, R – 3μ/2n – kf(2ρn
2/μ – 1) – 1 > 0.  
16 
outsiders do not observe the quality of a bank’s risk management systems, the 
capital at risk effect cannot operate indirectly through the price of capital. 
 
 
5  Flat capital requirements with information 
disclosure: Basel II standardized approach 
In the absence of information disclosure, the equilibrium quality of banks’ risk 
management reflects insiders’ private incentives to improve these systems. In this 
section, we assume that under the Basel II standardized approach, the Pillar 3 
disclosure requirements make the risk of an individual bank fully observable
16 and 
thus priced by the market. We show that this increases the equilibrium quality of 
banks’ risk management relative to the Basel I. 
  In our specification, the only difference between the Basel I and the Basel II 
standardized approach is that under the latter, the choice of qi is made fully public 
by the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements. The minimum capital requirement, 
however, remains unchanged. 
  Replacing expected quality with the actual quality in (4.1) gives an individual 
bank’s cost of capital, 
SA
i S , under the Basel II standardized approach 
 
) k r R ( q
k







=  (5.1) 
 
Inserting this into (4.2) simplifies the bank i’s insiders’ problem as the following 
 
} q D ] k ) k r R ( q {[ Max
2
i i i i i i k k , r r ], 1 , 0 [ q f i i
− ρ − + −
≥ ≥ ∈  (5.2) 
 
Differentiating this objective function with respect to ki gives (qi – ρ)Di < 0, so, 
again, we have a corner solution k = kf. 
  In what follows, we concentrate on the interior equilibrium, where the 
constraint  r ri ≥  is not binding. By differentiating (5.2), setting k  =  kf and 




r R ) k 1 (
q







                                                 
16 In section 7, we examine the partial disclosure scenario.  
17 
The first-order condition with respect to r is as under the flat capital requirements 
(4.3b). From (4.3b) and (5.3), the equilibrium quality qSA under the Basel II 
standardized approach is implicitly characterized as 
 
0 nk q ) nq ( 2 ) q ( G f
2
SA = ρ − μ − ≡  (5.4) 
 
By comparing the equilibrium quality
17 under the Basel I with that under the 
Basel II standardized approach, we get the following result. 
 
Proposition 2. The equilibrium quality of banks’ risk management is higher and 
the deposit rate lower under the Basel II standardized approach than under the 
Basel I approach. 
 
Proof. Evaluating GSA(q) at qI = μ/2n
2 gives GSA(qI) = –ρnkf < 0. This, together 
with the fact that ∂GSA/∂q = 4qn
2 – μ > 0 for all q > μ/4n
2 implies that qSA > qI. 
This, in turn, by (4.3b), implies that rSA < rI. 
 
Similarly as in Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2002), the information disclosure 
fosters banks’ quality competition in our model. Because of the disclosure, the 
bank-specific risk is priced in banks’ cost of capital. This improves insiders’ 
incentives to improve the quality of risk management. Notice that the introduction 
of the information disclosure also improves the social welfare, as it is an 
increasing function of q for all q  ≤ qFB = R/2.
18 The depositors, however, are 
worse-off under the Basel II standardized approach than under the Basel I 
approach, as bank insiders require compensation for their increased cost of effort 
in the form of lower deposit rates. 













− = ∂ ∂  (5.5) 
 
By Propositions 1 and 2, qSA > qI = μ/2n
2 > μ/4n
2. Therefore, the above derivative, 
evaluated at qSA, is positive. 
                                                 
17 The quadratic equation (5.4) has two roots. We can concentrate on the bigger root as the smaller 
root is negative by the facts that ∂GSA(q)/∂q < 0, for q < μ/4n
2 and GSA(0) < 0. 
18 A higher quality of banks’ risk management systems and the associated lower probability of 
default implies a higher level of welfare. The equilibrium values of deposit rates, capital levels and 
the cost of capital do not affect the total welfare, as they only determine how the final payoffs are 
divided between the risk-neutral parties.  
18 
  The expression (5.5) implies that under full disclosure, an increase in capital 
requirements improves bank safety.
19 The reasoning goes as follows. As the 
capital requirement is always binding in the equilibrium, a stricter capital 
requirement forces a bank to raise more capital, which increases it’s capital 
expenditure (the amount of capital times the cost of capital) for a given quality of 
the bank’s risk management systems. Therefore, a given increase in the quality of 
a bank’s risk managements systems and the associated lower cost of capital 
produces a bigger absolute reduction in the bank’s capital expenditure the higher 
is the capital requirement. As a result, stricter capital requirements improve 




6  Internal ratings-based (IRB) approach 
Under the Basel II capital regulation, banks are also allowed to use a more 
sophisticated approach, the internal ratings-based approach (IRB), for calculating 
their minimum capital requirements for credit risk. In this paper, we focus on two 
differences between the IRB approach and Basel II standardized approach. First, 
under the IRB approach, the entry into and ongoing use of the approach requires a 
bank to meet a detailed set of minimum requirements (‘IRB qualifying 
requirements’)
20. Second, according to Basel Committee’s Quantitative Impact 
Studies, the average minimum required capital levels for those banks who apply 
the IRB approach are likely to be lower than under the Basel I and Basel II 
standardized approaches.
21 
                                                 
19 An implicit differentiation of (5.4) gives also the other relevant comparative statics: ∂qSA/∂ρ > 0 
and  ∂qSA/∂μ > 0, for all q > μ/4n
2. The sign of ∂qSA/∂n = –(4nq
2 – ρkf)/(4qn
2 – μ), evaluated at 
q = qSA, is negative. The proof is available from the author upon request. 
20 These minimum requirements concern (a) composition of minimum requirements, (b) 
compliance of minimum requirements, (c) rating system design, (d) risk rating system operations, 
(e) corporate governance and oversight, (f) use of internal ratings, (g) risk quantification, (h) 
validation of internal estimates (i) supervisory LGD and EAD estimates, (j) requirements for 
recognition of leasing, (k) supervisory calculation of capital charges for equity exposures, and (l) 
disclosure requirements (see Basel Committee, 2006a, paragraphs 387–537). Supervisors must, in 
their Pillar 2 supervisory review process, ensure that these requirements are being met, both as 
qualifying criteria and on a continuing basis. 
21 According to Basel Committee’s (2006b) fifth quantitative impact study, G10 and European 
banks’ minimum required capital levels under the advanced IRB approach (AIRB) would, on 
average, fall by 7 to 29 per cent relative to the Basel I approach. However, for banks using the IRB 
approach, there will be a capital floor for at least three years following the implementation of the 
framework, which limits the amount of reduction in banks’ minimum capital requirements.  
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  These assumptions are captured in the following definitions: 
 
Definition 1. The IRB qualifying requirement is denoted by the parameter q. 
 
Definition 2. The IRB capital requirements are given by a pair  ) k , q ( IRB  such that 
 
 if  q qi ≥ , then K = kIRB, where 0 < kIRB < kf 
 if  q qi < , then K = kf 
 
This is as a reduced specification of the IRB approach. Only those banks whose 
risk management systems satisfy  q qi ≥  are allowed to enter into and use the IRB 
approach subject to a supervisory approval. To induce the banks to use the IRB 
approach, the minimum regulatory capital under the IRB approach is set at a 
lower level than that under the Basel I and Basel II standardized approaches: 
0 < kIRB < kf. Banks with  q qi <  are required to apply the Basel II standardized 
approach with a minimum capital-to-deposit ratio kf.
22 
  Consider the determination of the equilibrium quality, qIRB, of banks’ risk 
management under the IRB approach. Assume that all banks are required to use 
the IRB and that banks’ quality choices, qi, i = 1,...,n, are made fully observable to 
market participants by the Pillar 3 disclosures. Given these assumptions, the 
maximization problem for a typical bank i’s insiders is 
 
} q D ) k r R ( q ) S 1 {( Max
2
i i i i i
IRB
i k k , r r , q q IRB i i i
− + − −
≥ ≥ ≥  (5.6) 
 
where ) q , r , k ( S i i i
IRB
i  denotes the bank i’s cost of capital under the IRB capital 
requirements. 
  Note that under full disclosure, the satisfaction of the IRB qualifying 
requirement  q qi ≥  does not convey any new information to market participants 
as they fully observe the bank’s choice of quality, qi. Therefore, the cost of capital 
for an individual bank is determined similarly as under the Basel II standardized 




i + − ρ ≡ = . Inserting this 
into (5.6) reduces the bank’s maximization problem as the following 
 
} q ] k ) k r R ( q {[ Max
2
i i i i i
k k , r r , q q IRB i i i
− ρ − + −
≥ ≥ ≥  (5.7) 
                                                 
22 The availability of the two options under the Basel II – the standardized approach and the IRB 
approach –  raises the question of which option banks would rather choose. However, we set this 
issue aside, as the exact implementation of the framework differs between countries. In some 
jurisdictions banks have more freedom to choose their preferred option, subject to supervisory 
approval. In some jurisdictions, for example in the US, the internationally active banks are 
required to use the IRB approach.  
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This maximization problem is similar to (5.2) except that in (5.7), there is an 
additional constraint  q qi ≥  and kf is replaced by kIRB. Obviously, the solution to 
(5.7) is affected strongly on whether the constraint  q qi ≥  is binding in the 
equilibrium or not, or, in other words, whether the IRB qualifying requirement q 
is ‘stringent’ or ‘lax’. In what follows, we assume that it is lax. That is guaranteed 
by the following assumption. 
 
Assumption 1.  IRB I q q q < < . 
 
The first inequality says that the minimum required quality of banks’ risk 
management systems under the IRB approach is higher than the equilibrium 
quality of risk management systems under the Basel I. Otherwise, the IRB 
qualifying requirement q  would always be irrelevant. The latter inequality 
implies that the constraint  q qi ≥  is not binding in the equilibrium under the IRB 
capital requirements with full disclosure. This assumption can be justified by the 
fact that the IRB qualifying requirements are based on current industry practices 
(Basel Committee, 2006a, paragraph 754). Therefore, the satisfaction of the IRB 
qualifying requirements may not require much additional effort from banks, 
especially from the most sophisticated ones. 
  Given Assumption 1, we obtain the implicit solution for the equilibrium 
quality of banks’ risk management under the IRB approach by following the steps 
(5.2) to (5.4) 
 
0 nk q ) nq ( 2 ) q ( G IRB
2
IRB = ρ − μ − ≡  (5.8) 
 
The comparison between the equilibrium qualities of banks’ risk management 
systems under the two options of the Basel II gives our next proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. Under full disclosure and lax IRB qualifying requirements, the 
equilibrium quality of banks’ risk management systems and the total welfare 
under the IRB approach are (i) higher than those under the Basel I but (ii) lower 
than those under the Basel II standardized approach. 
 
Proof. The proof of (i) follows along the lines of the proof of Proposition 2. 
Evaluating GIRB(q) at qI = μ/2n
2 gives GIRB(qI) = –ρnkf < 0. The rest follows from 
the fact that ∂GIRB/∂q = 4qn
2 – μ > 0. The proof of (ii) follows from comparing 
(5.4) and (5.8). Using the assumption that kIRB < kf, and the fact that ∂GIRB/∂q > 0 
for all q > μ/4n
2 implies that qIRB < qSA. 
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The reason for the first result is the same as under the previous section. Under the 
IRB approach, the Pillar 3 disclosures make the quality of banks’ risk 
management systems, and thus banks’ riskiness, observable and priced in banks’ 
cost of capital. Because of this effect, bank insiders have greater incentives to 
improve the quality of their portfolios under the IRB approach than under the 
Basel I. 
  The reason for the second result is the following. As the IRB qualifying 
requirement is assumed to be lax, it does not affect banks’ equilibrium safety. The 
only difference between the Basel II standardized approach and the IRB approach 
that affects the equilibrium safety is the difference in minimum capital 
requirements. By assumption, the minimum capital requirement is lower under the 
IRB approach than under the Basel II standardized approach. Therefore, the 
disciplinary capital at risk effect of capital requirements is weaker under the IRB 
approach than under the Basel II standardized approach. Thus, higher capital 
requirements under the Basel II standardized approach induce bank insiders to 
improve their banks’ risk management systems more than the lower capital 
requirements under the IRB approach. 
  The welfare implications follow from the fact that the total welfare is an 
increasing function of the equilibrium value of q for q ≤ R/2. Interestingly, the 
result of the Proposition 3, qSA > qIRB > qI, implies, by (4.3b), that rSA < rIRB < rI. 
Thus, the depositors’ welfare is the lowest under the Basel II standardized 
approach, which generates the highest total welfare of the three approaches. 
  If our assumption that the IRB qualifying requirements are lax is relevant, our 
results suggest that the IRB approach may, in the worst case, only relax banks’ 
capital requirements without providing them any additional incentives to improve 
their risk management systems, relative to the Basel II standardized approach. In 
this scenario, the IRB option, relative to the Basel II standardized approach, 
provides banks a free lunch with lower minimum capital requirements and non-
binding IRB qualifying requirements. 
 
 
7 Partial  disclosure 
Thus far we have assumed that the quality of banks’ risk management systems is 
either completely non-observable (Basel I) or fully disclosed to the public (Basel 
II). In this section, we examine the impacts of the Basel II standardized and IRB 
approaches on bank risk taking under a more realistic scenario of partial public 
disclosure. In this scenario, the Pillar 3 disclosures improve investors’ knowledge 
of banks’ risk management systems but do not make them fully transparent. 
  We follow Boot and Schmeits (2000) and Hyytinen and Takalo (2002), for 
example, by assuming that market participants observe the quality, qi of a bank’s  
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risk management systems only with a probability p. With a probability (1–p) they 
do not observe the quality, but evaluate it rationally 
e
i i q ) q ( E = . We interpret p as 
the stringency of the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements. The higher the p, the more 
information banks are required to provide to market participants in Pillar 3 on 
their risk exposures, the structure and organization of their risk management, their 
policies for hedging and mitigating risk etc. The stricter are these stringency 
requirements, the more reliably can outsiders evaluate the quality of banks’ risk 
management systems. 
  Before examining the general case with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, it is useful to collect our 
results of the cases p = 0 and p = 1. Denote the equilibrium quality of banks’ risk 
management systems under the standardized approach by qSA(p) and under the 
IRB approach by qIRB(p). The case with p = 0 corresponds in our model to the 
scenario of no disclosure. Thus, in that case, the Basel II standardized approach is 
equivalent with the Basel I approach. Therefore, by Proposition 3(i), 
qIRB(0) > qSA(0) = qI(0). On the other hand, by Proposition 3(ii), qIRB(1) < qSA(1). 
In other words, the IRB approach generates higher equilibrium quality of banks’ 
risk management than the Basel II standardized approach under no disclosure but 
lower equilibrium quality under full disclosure. 
  In the light of this result, it is intuitive to expect that, by continuity, there 
exists a critical level of disclosure p
* ∈  (0,1) below which the IRB capital 
requirements generate a higher quality of banks’ risk management and above 
which the standardized approach generates the higher quality. In the following 
key proposition of this paper, we show that this is indeed the case. 
 
Proposition 4. Under lax Pillar 3 disclosure requirements, the equilibrium quality 
of banks’ risk management and the total welfare is higher under the IRB approach 
than under the Basel II standardized approach. Under stringent Pillar 3 disclosure 
requirements, the reverse obtains. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
Under lax Pillar 3 disclosure requirements (low p), insiders’ incentives to improve 
the quality of risk management are low under the Basel II standardized approach, 
as an increase in their effort is likely to remain unobserved and thus unrewarded 
by a lower cost of capital. Thus, when p approaches zero, the equilibrium quality 
under the standardized approach comes nearer to the equilibrium quality under no 
regulation. On the other hand, under the IRB approach, the IRB qualifying 
requirement  q qi ≥  becomes binding for low values of p and thus sets a lower 
limit to the quality of risk management, which is higher than the corresponding 
level under no regulation. Under stringent Pillar 3 disclosure requirements (high 
p), an increase in the quality is more likely to be observed and rewarded. As the  
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increase in the quality is more handsomely rewarded under the Basel II 
standardized approach (in the form of a bigger reduction in the bank’s capital 
expenditure for a given increase in quality), the equilibrium level of quality under 
that regime is higher than under the IRB approach. 
 
 
8  Discussion: Multiple assets 
In our model, we assume that banks can only invest in a single asset. This 
assumption may oversimplify the analysis of risk-based capital requirements, as 
the key element of the IRB capital requirements is that banks are required to hold 
different amount of capital against assets with different credit risks. In this 
section, we discuss how the introduction of multiple assets might affect our 
results. 
  To examine that, it is useful consider the model of Repullo (2004). He 
examines the impact of risk-based capital requirements on banks’ risk-taking in a 
model where banks can invest either in a prudent or a risky asset and where the 
deposit competition is similar as in the present paper. He sets the capital 
requirement for the prudent asset as zero and for the risky asset as positive and 
shows that these risk-based capital requirements can ensure the existence of a so-
called prudent equilibrium where all banks invest in the prudent asset. Thus, risk-
based capital requirements fully resolve the asset substitution moral hazard 
problem. More generally, Repullo’s results suggest that risk-based capital 
requirements are more effective that flat capital requirements in reducing the asset 
substitution moral hazard. 
  The present paper suggests that relatively high flat capital requirements 
combined with an effective market discipline may be more effective than lower 
IRB capital requirements in reducing the effort aversion moral hazard. The reason 
for this result stems from the assumption that the minimum capital requirements 
under the Basel II standardized approach are higher than those under the IRB 
approach. Higher capital requirements induce stronger market discipline, which 
improves banks’ incentives to improve the quality of their risk management 
systems. Importantly, this effect is likely to persist also in a model with multiple 
assets as the risk-based capital requirements for low risk assets are, by 
construction, set at a lower level than flat capital requirements. 
  To summarise, on the basis of Repullo (2004) and the present paper, risk-
based capital requirements may to be more effective than flat capital requirements 
in reducing the asset substitution moral hazard but less effective in reducing the 
effort aversion moral hazard. Therefore, it is not obvious a priori which regulatory 
option would generate higher welfare in a model with multiple assets. Analyzing 
that would require a model in which bank insiders make both a loan portfolio  
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decision and an effort decision a la Besanko and Kanatas (1996), for example. 
This remains to be done in the future research. 
 
 
9 Concluding  comments 
In this paper, we show that an explicit modeling of the information disclosure and 
the agency problem between banks’ insiders and outside investors gives new 
insights on the effectiveness of different types of regulatory capital requirements. 
In particular, our results suggest that the effectiveness of regulatory capital 
requirements in improving bank safety may crucially depend on the stringency of 
banks’ disclosure requirements. Thereby, our results provide support for the Basel 
Committee’s decision to include disclosure requirements in the Basel II 
framework. 
  Our results are based on the assumption that the bank capital is initially held 
by banks’ owner-managers or a small number of inside shareholders, who make 
the decisions in the bank. Capital requirements then force banks’ to issue new 
equity to meet the new standards. This creates a conflict of interest between 
banks’ initial and new shareholders, which shapes our results. 
  A familiar critique towards owner-manager and insider-outsider models of 
banking is that large banks’ capital is widely held and that the most relevant 
conflict of interests are between the bank’s managers and the outside financiers 
(depositors and shareholders) and not between different types of financiers. 
However, we believe that our model is topical as it may illustrate some potential 
implications of the recent and potentially forthcoming massive bank 
recapitalizations. As a consequence of the financial crisis that started in the 
summer of 2007, the US and European financial institutions had raised more than 
$900 billion of new capital by the end of 2008 to mitigate their losses (IMF 2009). 
Essentially, similarly as in our model, banks have been forced to raise new capital 
to satisfy the minimum capital requirements. In addition, much of this new capital 
has come from new shareholders, especially from public sources and sovereign 
wealth funds. 
  If we believe that the agency problem between banks’ old inside shareholders 
and new shareholders has economic significance, our model implies that banks’ 
cost of new private capital is affected by the degree of transparency of banks’ 
riskiness. This level of transparency depends, inter alia, on the stringency of 
banks’ Basel II Pillar 3 disclosure requirements. If potential investors regard 
banks’ financial information as opaque, they may find it difficult to identify the 
banks with the best future prospects among those that are seeking new capital. In 
that case, private capital raising may be difficult even for the least risky banks. In 
addition, under low transparency, banks’ insiders’ incentives to improve their  
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bank’s risk management systems might be relatively low, as their effort is 
unlikely to be adequately rewarded in their bank’s cost of new capital. On the 
other hand, under high transparency and stringent disclosure requirements, the 
cost of capital better reflect banks’ inherent riskiness. This enables better banks to 
raise cheaper capital and provides bank insiders better incentives to improve their 
banks’ risk management. 
  In our model, we assume that in the absence of exogenously set disclosure 
requirements, banks cannot voluntary disclosure information on their level of 
effort. One may call this assumption into question, as, in reality, banks voluntarily 
provide an overwhelming amount of information to market participants. However, 
we assume that in the absence of stringent mandatory disclosure requirements 
providing a common metric, outsiders cannot easily evaluate banks’ risk 
exposures and the quality of their risk management on the basis of their 
voluntarily provided financial information.
23 The imposition of Basel II Pillar 3 
disclosure requirements, by itself, provides indirect evidence that regulators also 
take this view. In fact, if a truthful voluntary disclosure was easy, the disclosure 
requirements would not have been needed in the first place. Most convincingly, 
the experiences from the current crisis provide indisputable evidence on the 
opacity of banks’ business and risks. 
  Finally, concerning our notion of market discipline, it is important to 
distinguish between ex ante market discipline and interim market discipline (see 
eg Freixas and Rochet, 2008, p. 335–336). Ex ante market discipline refers to the 
hypothesis that investors accurately evaluate the risks taken by bank insiders so 
that they are reflected in the bank’s security prices. Interim market discipline, in 
turn, refers to the process by which investors are able to discipline bank insiders 
by eg liquidating the bank or by reducing the volume of business they undertake 
with riskier banks. In our model, market discipline operates through the ex ante 
market discipline, or, more specifically, through the price of equity in the primary 
equity market. However, new equity offerings are relatively rare. Most often, 
market discipline operates through the pricing of bank securities in money 
markets, bond markets and secondary equity markets. An interesting further 
avenue of research would be to examine the interplay of capital requirements and 
market discipline when the latter operates through those channels. 
 
                                                 
23 For example, the US authorities make publicly available certain fixed format banking regulatory 
reports. According to a survey by Federal Reserve Board’s Study Group on disclosure (2000), the 
users of the disclosed information, such as securities analyst, rating agencies and institutional 
investors, value these reports as they allow direct comparison among banks whereas banks’ 
voluntary disclosures are not so easily comparable.  
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Proof of Proposition 4. In this proof, we derive the functions qSA(p) and qIRB(p) 
for p ∈ (0,1) and show that ∂qSA/∂p > ∂qIRB/∂p > 0 for all p ∈ (0,1). This, together 
with the facts that qSA(0) < qIRB(0) and qSA(1) > qIRB(1) guarantees that the curve 
qSA(p) crosses the curve qIRB(p) once from below at some point p
* ∈ (0,1). 





) p ( SA
i S ) p 1 ( pS S − + ≡ , 
where 
) p ( SA
i S  denotes the bank i’s cost of capital under the standardized approach 
with partial disclosure and where 
SA
i S  is given by (5.1) and 
I
i S  by (4.1). The 
insiders’ problem is 
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Inserting the formula of 
) p ( SA
i S  into (A1.1) and differentiating it with respect to ki 
yields  0 D ) q ( i i < ρ −  so, similarly as before, we have a corner solution ki = kf. By 
differentiating (A1.1) with respect to qi, setting k = kf and imposing symmetry, we 

















The first-order condition with respect to r is as under (4.3b). From (A1.2) and 
(4.3b), we obtain that the equilibrium quality of banks’ risk management systems, 
qSA(p), is implicitly characterized by 
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Now, following the similar steps, derive the function qIRB(p). First, note that 
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insiders’ problem is 
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Inserting the formula of 
) p ( IRB
i S  into (A1.5) gives 
 
2
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IRB i i i
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Differentiating (A1.5’) with respect to ki gives  0 D ] p q / ) p 1 ( q q [ i i i < ρ − − ρ − , 
since ρ > R and  q qi ≥ . So, again, we have a corner solution ki. = kIRB. Inserting 
this into (A1.5’), differentiating it with respect to qi and ri and assuming symmetry 
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From (A1.6a) and (A1.6b), we obtain that the equilibrium quality of banks’ risk 
management systems, qIRB(p), is implicitly determined by 
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Comparing (A1.4) and (A1.8) and using the fact that kf > kIRB shows that 
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